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Discover how macro fundamentals, governance and climate risk shape emerging market sovereign credit spreads, and why government effectiveness and country-level climate exposure matter for investors.
Emerging market (EM) sovereign credit risk is usually read through a familiar lens: global financing conditions and domestic macro fundamentals. This article asks whether governance and climate-related variables also help explain how EM sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) reprice once those core drivers are taken into account.
Drawing on a panel of EM sovereigns since the early 2000s, and focusing on how individual countries reprice over time rather than how they compare with one another at a single point, the analysis suggests that they do.
The macro lens still does much of the heavy lifting, but it does not tell the whole story. Governance stands out as the clearest non-macro signal, with government effectiveness emerging as the most economically meaningful channel, in our opinion. That result is consistent with a simple market intuition: investors may be less interested in institutional quality in the abstract than in whether the state can actually deliver, regulate and enforce. On that reading, broader democratic quality is not irrelevant, but may reach markets more slowly and indirectly – feeding over time into political stability, policy credibility and, ultimately, the macro variables that sovereign spreads price most directly.
Climate also shows through in sovereign repricing, though as a smaller and more uneven layer. Both temperature anomalies and carbon‑related exposure are associated with wider CDS spreads, but the average effect masks substantial cross‑country variation. That makes climate more useful as a country‑selection lens than as a broad‑brush call on emerging markets as a whole.
The physical‑risk channel is intuitive: unusually hot conditions can weigh on growth, food and energy systems, and public finances, especially where adaptation capacity is weak. The transition channel is different but no less relevant: more carbon‑intensive growth can leave sovereigns more exposed to adjustment costs, policy shifts and external vulnerabilities as decarbonisation gathers pace.
What matters, then, is not simply whether climate matters, but where it matters most. Recent temperature anomalies have not been uniform across emerging markets, with heavier warming concentrated in parts of the Mediterranean and the Europe‑to‑Central Asia belt, while other regions appear less exposed on this measure.
The transition story is similarly uneven. Countries growing with lower carbon intensity than peers may be better placed for a more constrained global carbon backdrop, while those whose growth remains more emissions‑heavy may face a tougher adjustment path.
For investors, the implication is not that macro should be displaced, but that it should be complemented. Governance helps explain an important part of what macro leaves aside, while climate adds a further layer of analysis that is most valuable when assessing specific sovereigns rather than the asset class in aggregate. That has relevance not only for sovereign credit, but also more broadly for currencies, equities and asset allocation, given how sovereign stress can shape funding conditions and the domestic operating environment.
The broader question is whether climate remains a secondary layer or becomes more directly priced over time. If physical shocks become more frequent and transition pressures more binding, the climate channel identified here may become harder for markets to treat as peripheral. For now, the message is more measured: in EM sovereign risk, macro sets the baseline, governance provides the strongest additional signal, and climate increasingly matters at the margin – especially where exposure is concentrated.
Sovereign credit risk in emerging markets is usually understood through two familiar forces: global financing conditions and domestic fundamentals. Yet recent years have offered persistent reminders that this lens, while powerful, may not capture the full picture. A succession of coups across Africa, renewed geopolitical pressure around key energy chokepoints, and a steady cadence of climate‑related shocks have all underscored that institutions and environmental exposure are far from background noise. They carry real potential to shape the policy, fiscal and financing backdrop in which sovereigns operate.
This article therefore takes up a simple question with practical implications for investors: after accounting for the usual macro drivers, do governance and climate-related variables still move the needle on EM sovereign credit default swaps (CDS)?
The study covers emerging markets since the beginning of the century, using 5‑year sovereign CDS spreads (in log form) as the dependent variable. Explanatory variables sit in four blocks:
Country fixed effects remove time‑invariant characteristics, allowing the analysis to capture within‑country repricing over time rather than static differences across countries. In other words, the question is not whether a weaker‑governance sovereign trades wider than a stronger‑governance one at a given point, but whether improvements (or deteriorations) within a single country are associated with movements in its own spreads. Explanatory variables are also lagged to mitigate simultaneity concerns.
Finally, the findings that follow should be read as correlational and economically meaningful, rather than causal.
The macro block behaves broadly as theory would suggest. As shown in Figure 1, higher volatility (VIX) and higher public debt are associated with wider CDS spreads, while stronger reserve cover is associated with tighter ones. To put one estimate into economic terms, a one-unit rise in the VIX is associated with roughly 3% wider CDS spreads, within a plausible range of 2% to 4%.
The Fed funds coefficient enters with a negative sign in this sample, which sits comfortably within the EM literature. In periods of abundant global liquidity, lower policy rates have tended to encourage a wave of emerging market issuance that, absent coordination across borrowers, can expand supply faster than demand and leave spreads wider rather than tighter. The relationship between US rates and EM risk premia is therefore best read as state-dependent, with the sign reflecting the liquidity backdrop of the sample1.
Figure 1 Macro drivers move CDS in the expected direction
Volatility and weaker balance sheets widen spreads; reserves tighten them
When the six governance pillars enter the picture, a clear hierarchy emerges. As shown in Figure 2, the strongest and most consistent association comes from indicators tied to state capacity and policy delivery: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Among these, government effectiveness stands out.
In practical terms, a one‑unit improvement in government effectiveness is associated with roughly 6% tighter CDS spreads. Political stability is also relevant, though with about half the estimated coefficient. Voice and accountability, which captures the broader democratic quality of a country, shows little‑to‑no direct relationship with CDS repricing.
This does not mean democratic quality is irrelevant. It means markets price what visibly affects the functioning of the economy, namely whether the state can deliver, regulate and enforce. Erosions in voice and accountability tend to surface in CDS more slowly and indirectly, but the six pillars are best understood as part of a single story unfolding at different speeds. Persistent gradual weakening of democratic quality may, over time, feed through into political stability, and from there into the real economy, eventually reaching the variables that markets price most directly.
Figure 2. Governance: state capacity beats abstract democratic quality
Metrics that measure the quality of institutions show the largest associations with tighter spreads; voice and accountability barely moves the needle
Both climate proxies are statistically significant and directionally intuitive, as shown in Figure 3. A 1°C temperature deviation from a country's historical norm is associated with roughly 15% wider CDS spreads, while a one‑unit increase in CO₂ emissions per capita is associated with roughly 8% wider spreads.
The confidence intervals here are visibly wider than those observed for governance, which is to be expected: climate exposure, and therefore the extent to which it matters for any given sovereign, is inherently heterogeneous. Some countries sit clearly in the firing line, while others are largely insulated.
As for what might be driving these results, the two channels tell different stories. On the physical side, hotter‑than‑normal conditions weigh on growth, food and energy systems, and public finances, with the effect most pronounced where adaptation capacity is weakest.
On the transition side, more carbon‑intensive economies may face higher adjustment costs and greater policy uncertainty, and their fiscal and external positions can become more exposed as the global economy decarbonises.
Figure 3. Climate matters, but unevenly across countries
Temperature anomalies show the stronger coefficient; carbon intensity adds a second, smaller transition-risk channel
A further angle worth considering is how much explanatory power governance and climate variables actually bring to the picture. The evidence, shown in Figure 4, indicates that governance does add meaningfully, but not every dimension contributes in equal measure. Voice and accountability adds virtually nothing, while regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption and political stability each provide a modest, yet relevant uplift. Government effectiveness takes the lion's share, lifting model fit by 0.089 and delivering roughly a 47% improvement over the baseline that captures only the macro backdrop.
Layering in the climate variables pushes explanatory power higher still, though the marginal gain is smaller. The hierarchy is unambiguous: once controlled for macro, governance does most of the additional work while climate sits as a meaningful but secondary layer. Importantly, climate's modest average contribution masks far larger effects in the sovereigns most directly exposed, which means it is a variable that earns its keep when assessing individual countries rather than when looking at the EM universe in aggregate.
Figure 4. Governance is the big lift; climate refines the picture
This chart suggests adding governance significantly improves model fit over a macro baseline, while climate provides an additional, more targeted layer of explanatory power
Having explored how governance and climate variables relate to CDS repricing, it is worth turning briefly to the underlying trends themselves. Looking at how these variables have moved over the past five to ten years adds practical texture to the analysis and gives a sense of where the action has been concentrated across the EM universe.
On governance, Figure 5 shows that improvements in government effectiveness over the past five years have clustered in a group of MENA and European EMs, with most of the better performers starting from mid‑range scores in the 55 to 65 band. These are not transformations from a weak base but credible reinforcements of already‑functional institutional frameworks.
Figure 5. Governance gains cluster in MENA and European Emerging Markets
The biggest 5-year improvers are reinforcing already-decent institutional frameworks, not climbing out of dysfunction
Figure 6. Warming is not uniform across Emerging Markets
Temperature anomalies are concentrated in the Mediterranean and Europe-to-Central Asia belt; these are the regions where the climate channel is most likely to surface in spreads
On climate, temperature anomalies between 2021 and 20252, as shown in Figure 6, have been far from uniform across emerging markets. The largest deviations sit in the Mediterranean and the Europe‑to‑Central Asia belt, with several countries recording anomalies above 1.0°C, while parts of South America and Sub‑Saharan Africa appear far less exposed on this measure. This unevenness is a reminder that climate does not act on emerging markets as a single bloc, and that any read on its impact on sovereign risk has to begin with the question of where a country sits on the warming map.
Transition risk tells a complementary story. Figure 7 plots CO₂ emissions per capita against real GDP growth, and two features stand out. The first is the upward slope of the relationship, which reflects the underlying trade‑off between growth and emissions. Technology, electrification and a more diversified energy mix can flatten this slope over time, but the trade‑off remains real.
The second is the position of individual countries relative to the line. Sovereigns sitting below it have delivered lower emissions growth than peers with comparable real growth rates, while those above have done the opposite.
Vietnam and Côte d'Ivoire offer an instructive contrast. Both have recorded similar average real growth rates over the past decade and both have seen emissions rise. The difference lies in how much carbon each unit of growth has carried: Côte d'Ivoire's emissions have risen modestly and well below the line, whereas Vietnam's growth has been heavily fuelled by emissions, leaving its growth story more exposed to transition risk going forward.
Figure 7. Growth versus carbon: who is decarbonising credibly?
Countries below the line deliver growth with lower carbon intensity than peers; those above it rely more on carbon-intensive growth and face greater transition risk.
Three practical takeaways follow from the analysis.
Sovereign credit.
Macro is necessary but not sufficient. Governance materially improves explanatory power and warrants explicit integration into sovereign analysis. More importantly, tracking within‑country trajectories – and particularly the direction of state capacity over time – adds a dynamic edge to standard cross‑country comparisons. Pairing macro screens with governance trends is likely to sharpen relative‑value calls, particularly in sovereigns undergoing reform or institutional drift.
Cross‑asset relevance.
Sovereign risk does not stay in CDS. Wider spreads typically coincide with weaker FX, higher funding costs and a more challenging backdrop for corporates. For equities and asset allocation, governance and climate are best read as a country‑risk lens shaping the policy, fiscal and financing environment.
Portfolio construction.
Climate heterogeneity is the opportunity. Climate risk is a selection story, not an index one, concentrated in countries where temperature stress is high and growth remains carbon‑intensive, especially in fossil‑fuel‑dependent economies. These are the cases where transition pressures are most likely to translate into fiscal and external strain, and where country‑level analysis could add the most value. As a final nuance, falling emissions alone do not signal credible decarbonisation: reductions that occur alongside sustained growth point to genuine decarbonisation, whereas those driven by weaker activity do not.
The macro lens captures a meaningful share of what moves EM sovereign CDS, but it leaves real signal on the table. Governance, and government effectiveness in particular, stands out as the clearest non‑macro driver, with an economic significance large enough to matter for portfolio decisions. Climate adds a smaller but genuine layer, unevenly distributed across countries and most relevant when assessing individual sovereigns rather than the EM universe as a whole.
None of this displaces the macro toolkit. It extends it. Institutional quality and climate exposure deserve to sit alongside debt, reserves and the VIX as part of a fuller framework for thinking about EM sovereign risk.
The open question, and one worth watching, is whether climate becomes more directly priced as physical shocks grow more frequent and transition pressures intensify. If it does, the secondary layer identified here may not stay secondary for long.
1 Avila-Yiptong et al. (2025), Do ESG Considerations Matter for Emerging Market Sovereign Spreads?, IMF Working Paper WP/25/73.
2 Temperature anomalies have been measured against the 1991-2020 baseline.
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